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At its sitting of 13 September 1984, the European Parliament referred the 
motion for a resolution by Mrs Lizin on the Pegard company and exports to 
COMECON (Doc. 2-466/84) to the CoffltRittee on External Economic Relations 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure. 
At its sitting of 23 October 1984, the European Parliament referred the motion 
for a resolution by Mr Linkohr on the restrictions imposed by the USA on the 
international transfer of technology and the damaging effects on industrial 
development in the European Community (Doc. 2-721/84) to the Committee on 
External Economic Relations as the committee responsible and to the Political 
Affairs Committee, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy, the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology and the 
Committee on Transport for their opinions. 
At its meeting of 21 November 1984, the committee decided to draw up a report 
and appointed Mr Toussaint rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 26 April 1985, 26 June 1985, 
25 September 1985, 26 September 1985, 19 December 1985, 20 November 1986, 
28 January 1987 and 29 January 1987. 
It organized a hearing on the subject on 26 September 1985. 
On 29 January 1987, the committee adopted the motion for resolution as a whole 
by 12 votes to O with 10 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Seeler, chairman; Mr Pons Grau, 
2nd vice-chairman; Mr Toussaint, 3rd vice-chairman and rapporteur; 
Mr Blumenfeld (deputizing for Mr van Aerssen), Mr Cano Pinto (deputizing for 
Mr Motchane), Mr Cohen (deputizing for Mr Topmann), Mr Escuder Croft, Mr Ford, 
Mr Grimaldos Grimaldos, Mr Hindley, Mr Lemmer, Mr Moorhouse, Mr Novelli, 
Mr Papakyriasis, Mrs Roberts, Mr Rossetti, Mr Saridakis (deputizing for 
Mr Pelikan>, Mr Silva Domingos, Mr Tridente, Mr Zahorka, Mr Zarges and 
Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul (deputizing for Hitzigrath). 
The opinions of the Political Affairs Committee, the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy and the Committee on Transport are 
attached; the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology has not delivered 
an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 9 February 1987. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Committee on External Economic R:elations hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for .a resolution together with explanatory 
statement: 
A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
• on the Pegard company, restrictions on strategic exports and US-EC technology 
transfer 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr LINKOHR on American 
restrictions on the international transfer of technology and the damaging 
effects on industrial development in the European Community 
(Doc. 2-721/84), 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mrs LIZIN on the Pegard 
company and exports to Comecon (Doc. 2-466/84), 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr MATTINA on relations 
between the Community and the Soviet Union (Doc. B 2-558/85), 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr PORDEA, Mr de CAMARET 
and Mr ROMUALDI on the resumption of negotiations between the EEC and 
CQ.MECON (Doc. B 2-643/85), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology on technology transfer (Doc. A 2-99/85)1, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations on relations between the European Community and the CMEA and the 
European member states of the CMEA (Doc. A 2-187/86), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations on the Pegard company, restrictions on strategic exports and 
US-EC technology transfer, and the opinions of the Political Affairs 
Committee, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy and the Committee on Transport (Doc. A 2-226/86), 
A. whereas there is a close link between scientific and industrial 
development and freedom to exchange ideas, knowledge and information, 
B. having regard to the interactions between Western Europe and the United 
States at all levels of industry and science, 
C. whereas the Soviet Union and the United States have attached increased 
importance to defence policy and related technological developments since 
the middle of the 1970s, 
D. whereas the scope of American export control legislation is much wider 
than that of the laws of most other countries (particularly the Member 
States of the European Community) and also covers re-exportation from 
third countries, 
loJ No. c 68, 24.3.86 
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E. whereas it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between 
purely civil and purely military technology, 
F. perturbed by the fact that the United States are more and more restricting 
transfers of new technologies, even to their Western Allies, to the 
detriment of trade between all parties concerned, 
G. recognizing that many of these restrictions imposed by the US serve 
American commercial rather than security interests, 
H. whereas the COCOM member states have agreed considerably to extend the 
lists of products and know-how that may not be exported to the Eastern 
bloc and have undertaken to comply with embargo agreements, 
I. whereas the CMEA and the Community have embarked upon talks aimed at 
putting their relations on a footing of mutual official recognition and 
improving and expanding economic relations between the Community and the 
European member states of the CMEA, 
J. anxious to arrive at a happy medium between the normal imperatives of a 
defence policy and the desire to extend free trade as far as possible, 
1. Notes that the controls imposed unilaterally by the United States on 
transfers of technology in addition to the COCOM controls limit Western 
Europe's access to American technology and thus hamper mutual economic 
relations and may impair scientific and research cooperation, 
2. Acknowledges the need for an agreement such as COCOM to limit or ban 
certain exports to certain countries; 
3. recognizes that American industry suffers the trade consequences of the 
export restrictions imposed by the Export Administration Act and the COCOM 
Lists and that European industry often suffers serious trade consequences 
and job Losses in consequence of the export restrictions imposed by the 
Export Administration Act and the COCOM Lists; 
4. Wonders about the effectiveness of some restrictive measures when the same 
products can be obtained on other markets and some Member States of the 
European Community have not joined COCOM, and believes that it would be 
appropriate to confine the COCOM lists to defence technology not available 
on the open market; 
5. Draws attention to the fact that there could be conflicts between some 
Community provisions and COCOM rules; 
6. Takes the view that COCOM agreements should be formalized and revised at 
regular intervals; 
7. Believes that the COCOM members must revise and review the lists of 
restrictions more frequently and more quickly so as to keep pace with 
technology change; 
8. Calls for the criteria for limiting technological exports to be defined as 
fully and precisely as possible early enough for them to be effectively 
applied; 
9. (a) Draws attention to the fact that a gentlemen's agreement that is not 
directly enforceable in law and under which arrangements are 
administered by agencies within the Member States has been acceptable 
hitherto, 
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(b) Supports the retention of coordination and decision-making mechanism 
for COCOM and does not beHeve that formally binding arrangements 
would be appropriate, 
<c> Requests the Commission to examine to what extent, bearing in mind 
the internal market, the Community can be included in COCOM as a 
separate legal entity, 
(d) Calls on the Member States of the Community to give their consent to 
this move, 
(e) Condemns the fact that the Commission is at present not even allowed 
access to the three COCOM restricted lists; 
10. Warns that Community integration in the areas most concerned, i.e. 
data-processing, computerization, biotechnoogy, aeronautics and 
astronautics, new materials and telecommunications, must not be obstructed 
by unilateral action by individual COCOM members; 
11. Calls on the Council and the Commission and on the Member States to invite 
the United States to guarantee unlimited transfers of technology and 
information between the United States and the EEC; 
12. Calls on the Commission to submit to Parliament proposals concerning the 
principles that should govern transfers of technology between the EEC and 
the countries to which the COCOM list currently applies; these principles 
should be based upon the real industrial interests of Community countries 
and industries; 
13. Considers that the COCOM Arrangement, in its present form, is a serious 
hindrance to East/West trade; 
14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and report to the 
Commission, the Council, the governments of the Member States and of the 
other member states of COCOM (Canada, Japan, Norway, Turkey and the US) 
and the COCOM permanent secretariat in Paris. 
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INTRODUCTION 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
The Pegard affair is now a closed book but it remains a valuable illustration 
of how COCOM works. To recap briefly on the affair, in 1982 the Belgian 
company Pegard supplied the USSR with an advanced boring and milling machine 
under a Belgian Licence without having submitted the matter to COCOM. There 
were protests from the USA. In 1984 an application was submitted to COCOM for 
a second, more sophisticated boring and milling machine and the Belgian 
Government refused to grant an export Licence. The affair aroused great 
controversy. The machine at the heart of the dispute was bought by the 
Belgian Army with American financial assistance which ended in 1985 with a 
cheque for US$ 715 700. Also in 1985, five new boring and milling machines 
of the same type but with technical modifications were exported to the USSR 
under the responsibility of the German authorities with the agreement of the 
Belgian Government, the regrets of the American Administration and without 
COCOM's approval of the decision being sought. 
The basic aim of this report is to analyse how COCOM operates. 
In an endeavour to compile as comprehensive a document as possible, the 
following steps were undertaken: a survey of UNICE and its experts: 
organization of a hearing with UNICE by the Committee on External Economic 
Relations which was held on 19 September 1985, a survey of NATO departments 
and the Belgian authorities, analysis of the results of a seminar on the 
subject of strategic exports and technology transfer held in Brussels from 6 
to 8 February 1986 under the auspices of the American mission to the OECD, 
NATO and the EEC and a meeting with the representative of the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Belgium and the representatives of the US Embassy to the 
Communities. 
The fullest account has been taken of the report by Mr METTEN on technology 
transfer drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology (Doc. A 2-99/85), adopted by Parliament in March 1986, the opinion 
by Mrs BRAUN-MOSER on behalf of the Committee on Transport (PE 98.215/fin.>, 
the opinion by Mr DANKERT on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee 
(PE 97.811/fin.), and the opinion by Mr RAFTERY on behalf of the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (PE 94.246/fin.). 
This report attempts to collate all this information and to provide an answer 
as to what decision the Community Member States should take regarding the 
export of strategic products and, on the basis of this decision in principle, 
to clarify the European position on COCOM. 
I. WHAT IS COCOM? 
1. Definition 
Coordinating committee for the control of exports to the Sino-Soviet 
bloc. 
lr.Kj{VS1)/4369E 
- 8 - PE 92.716/fin. 
- COCOM was set up on the initiative of the United States during the 
Korean War (June 1950>; it coordinates the activities of its member 
states with a view to preventi'ng the export of strategic products to 
the Sino-Soviet bloc 
- COCOM is separate from NATO. It has no lerl personality as such and 
takes the form of an intergovernmental con erence. 
- There are 15 member states, 12 of which are in Europe: B - FRG - DK -
F - GB - GR - I - L - N - NL - P and TR. The three other countries are 
Canada, Japan and the United States. 
Note: The 15 member states of COCOM are the 15 member states of NATO 
with the exception of Iceland and the addition of Japan. 
- Address of the COCOM Secretariat: The United States Embassy in Paris. 
- Budget: approx. US• 1 million per annum. 
2. Modus operandi 
As the committee has no basis in any treaty, implementation of its 
decisions is entirely dependent on the VOLUNTARY cooperation of the Member 
States. Over the years, COCOM has proved to be surprisingly effective. 
The list of products concerned is reviewed at regular intervals. It 
decreased from 300 in the early 1950s to 150 by the end of the 1970s1. 
Any decision to make exemptions from this list requires a unanimous vote 
by the member states. In practice, there are cases in which states issue 
licences without referral to COCOM. 
In .the United States, COCOM is the responsibility of the State Department 
which plays a major role in drawing up the COCOM lists. 
A COCOM meeting was held on 8 October 1985 in Paris. The participants 
stated that they had discussed measures to improve the technical bases for 
corttrol. At this meeting, Spain became a full member of COCOM. The 
decision to do so had been taken on 18 September 1985 at a meeting of the 
Sp~nish Council of Ministers. 
3. The EEC and the COCOM Lists 
1 
Mr SEELER discussed this issue in some detail in his report on behalf of 
the Committee on External Economic Relations on the significance of 
economic sanctions, particularly trade embargoes and boycotts and their 
consequences for the EEC's relations with third countries (Doc. 1-83/82, 
page 27 ff): 
'Since the EEC countries were unwilling to agree to extend the 
embargo on technology over and above the COCOM lists, it is probable 
that the US has Lost part of its share of the market in this sector 
to other Western exporting countries. The 1980 figures for the 
export of industrial goods to the USSR from the US show a marked fall 
compared with 1979. In 1979 the US exported industrial products to 
the value of US$ 656 million, whereas in 1980 it exported only 
US$ 424 millions' worth.' 
Gary K. BERTSCH, US export controls: The 1970's and beyond, Journal of 
world trade Law, p. 72 - <January - February 1981) 
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At the Ottawa World Summit of July 1981 it was decided to review the 
catalogue of Lists. Negotiations on this also took place in Paris in 
January and October 1982, July 1984 and finally 8 October 1985. At the 
meeting in October 1985, the USA gave prominence to a published report by 
the Secretary for Defense, Caspar WEINBERGER, maintaining that the West 
was 'subsidizing the consolidation of Soviet military power' by allowing 
the USSR to acquire, Legally or otherwise, Western technology. This point 
of view apparently met with a certain sympathy from the European countries 
as, shortly afterwards, France published a notice in its Official Journal 
on new methods for controlling technology exports and Spain imposed a fine 
of US$ 1 million on the Spanish firm PITHER-SEMICONOUCTORES for exporting 
American equipment to Cuba and the USSR. 
4. Comments 
The COCOM Lists are never published in full which gives the authority 
drawing it up plenty of Latitude for unilateral assessment. 
Ireland is a member of the EEC but not of NATO and is therefore not 
bound by that Treaty nor by the institutions set up under it. 
- Trade between East and West Germany also has a number of features which 
might encourage 'permeability' between the two blocs, East and West. 
Ultimately, only a system of Community regulations would guarantee 
genuinely effective restriction of exports of strategic products and 
ensure respect for the internal interests of all the contracting parties. 
II. AMERICAN EXPORT CONTROL POLICY 
On 12 July 1985, President Reagan signed the amendments to the Export 
Administration Act of 1985. The 1979 Export Administration Act was to have 
expired on 30 September 1983 but it had been extended successively until 1985. 
American exporters had suffered Losses through the application of the old 
Export Administration Act. They were demanding no less than the repeal of 
Section 6 of the EAA concerning foreign policy on export control but the 
Senate and the House of Representatives would not go that far. Thus, the 
Administration is prohibited from restricting or banning the export or 
re-export of goods, technology or information if the contracts or agreements 
entered into force before the controls were enacted. In fact, in the final 
analysis, the US Administration no Longer has the same possibilities of 
unilaterally banning or restricting exports though, at the same time, American 
Law is clearer and throws its net wider. 
The 1985 EAA Lays down procedures for issuing Licences for exports to COCOM 
countries based on the technology thresholds Laid down by COCOM. 
The EAA has no effect at all on the role played by the Oefense Department in 
controlling East-West exports. 
Henceforth, the types of Licences for technology transfer have a clear 
statutory basis. 
In the case of microprocessors, the new EAA contains provisions which reduce 
export controls on non-reprogrammable equipment. 
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On the other hand, it contains provisions for the imposition of sanctions 
against foreign firms which violate US national security measures but the· 
agreement of a majority of COCOM members must be obtained· before such 
sanctions can be applied. 
The 1985 EAA provides that existing contracts cannot be broken except in cases 
where a 'breach of the peace' represents a serious and immediate threat to the 
strategic interests of the United States. 
As with the 1979 Act, the 1985 Act cannot in principle be applied outside the 
United States. (The US Customs are responsible for enforcing the Laws). 
f.r.!s!n.! .!.r!n.2 in_A.!!!e_!:i_£_a_!! _eo_!.i_£y_o_!! _!x.e,o_!:t.! 2,f_s.Y.!t!g_ic_m_!t!rla! 
In general, the slackening off of East-West trade is not solely due to the 
application of COCOM or the Export Administration Act, but to a range of 
political and financial considerations. At the same time, we are witnessing a 
growth in bilateral trade between the USSR and Japan and a fall in trade 
between the USSR and the United States. 
On 5 May 1984, without P.Xplicitly abandoning the principle of extra-
territoriality, Secretary of State SHULTZ put forward proposals to tone down 
the effects of the restrictive export measures and outlined a four-point 
programme: 
An agreement to be sought with the European allies on basic principles for 
the restriction of exports of advanced technology to the Communist 
countries; 
The United States not to apply trade sanctions until it has 'tried to take 
into account the foreign interests involved'; 
The various sections of the American Administration to consult the State 
Department 'when they ;ntend to take measures which might kindle reaction 
abroad over sensitive matters of jurisdiction; 
The United States to attempt to draw up procedures through the OECD and 
the UN for prior consultation on such issues. 
III. THE EUROPEAN POSITIONS 
1. Hearing by the Committee on e,ternal Economic Relations with 
representatives of the Union of Industries of the EC, 26 September 1985 
Participants were in agreement on a broad range of issues and stated 
that they accepted the COCOM system as it stood. In their view the 
system combined security needs with trade requirements relatively well 
and in a sufficiently flexible manner and took into account the 
complexity of the problems involved. There was apparently no 
discrimination between one country and another but it would be useful 
for small firms who were poorly informed to improve publicity about the 
COCOM system. COCOM's methods of working and manner of drawing up its 
lists should also be more readily ac·cessiblt. The legal basis for COCOM 
was judged to be adequate. On the whole the American econoll}' would seem 
to be more affected by the repercussions of COCOM than the European 
economy. Judging by statements made by European industrialists at the 
hearing, COCOM does not paralyse East-West trade. Participants were 
also eager to stress that the complexity of international trade 
relations in the world today was a reality that none could escape. 
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2. The Brussels seminar (6-8 February 1986) 
The opinions expressed were extremely varied. In practice, however, there 
are two distinguishable theories which may be roughly defined as American 
and European. 
- According to the 'American' theory, the two blocs, East and West, are 
indomitably hostile to each other. Their mutual survival is contingent 
upon a delicate balance of forces. Everyone should therefore try to 
hold on to their trump cards and not give them away to the other side. 
In essence, this is an isolationist policy which tries to prohibit as 
much as possible any form of transfer to the East. 
- According to the 'European' theory, hostility between the two blocs is 
essentially a matter of historical chance which has left the two areas 
with different political and economic systems, a different level of 
development and divergent, or even conflicting, interests. This 
situation can be reversed. By increasing economic, political, trade and 
other forms of contact, it is possible gradually to build up a 
communality of interest which will outweigh the divergences and in the 
long term can bring the two blocs closer together. From this point of 
view, the 'outstretched hand' is the approach always adopted. 
In the long run, technical cooperation, i.e. a common or at least 
complementary technological development policy can be envisaged. The 
task is to seek out and to cultivate everything which could be of mutual 
benefit to the partners. 
IV. RECENT POSITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. The METTEN report on technology transfer (Doc. A 2-99/85, p. 21) 
According to the METTEN report, the United States should be aware: 
- 'that it is unacceptable to declare its legislation enforceable on the 
territory of its allies. If measures need to be taken by its allies in 
the light of security or foreign policy considerations, consultations 
constitute the means to achieve the objectives concerned. 
In the security field, the appropriate forum for consultations is 
COCOM. However, it is in no way appropriate for the US first to obtain 
major concessions from its allies in such consultations and then, 
however, to apply additional, bilateral controls that also affect these 
allies. 
Agreed multilateral controls imply the abolition of unilateral controls. 
The further review of the Export Administration Act, with a view to 
amendment, presents a timely opportunity to assess US intentions.' 
2. On embargoes and boycotts 
sanctions trade 
I OJ No. C 292, 9.11.1982, p. 13 ff 
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After noting that embargoes and boycotts are sanctions recognized in 
international Law, the report stresses that the history of economic 
sanctions is one of fruitless measures unsatisfactory as a means of 
achieving foreign policy objectives (even if they may serve to complement 
other forms of action). The report also stresses the adverse side-effects 
of economic sanctions. 
3. On relations with COMECON 
The Committee on External Economic Relations is drawing up a report on 
relations between the EEC and COMECON with Mr SEELER as rapporteur. We 
refer to the conclusions in this report which has not yet been adopted. 
4. The DANKERT opinion (Political Affairs Committee - PE 97.811/fin., p. 4) 
In reference to the subject under discussion here, the opinion states: 
'A separate problem with regard to the COCOM List of strategic goods is 
the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the group of 
Communist countries to which the List applies. There is both strategic 
and commercial justification for a more flexible policy vis-a-vis the 
People's Republic. 
It has already been noted that COCOM restrictions are of significance 
not only to trade with Communist countries but also to commercial 
dealings among the Member States of COCOM itself. The incorporation of 
COCOM agreements into national Legislation is detrimental to the 
European market in particular: an export Licence is required in order 
to trade, within Western Europe, in goods that are subject to COCOM 
conditions.•1 
It should be noted that the American position is becoming more entrenched 
and the intention is to restrict their technological exports to the USSR 
whereas China is being treated more openly, in fact increasingly so. 
There is therefore nothing to prevent China from re-exporting to the USSR 
technology for which she (China) can have no direct use, for example in 
order to acquire foreign exchange. The export control policy is thus not 
necessarily as coherent and watertight as it might seem at first glance. 
Furthermore, the Latest trade agreement between Japan and the United 
States on semi-conductors could produce a paradoxical situation whereby 
the United States' European allies would not be able to import Japanese 
semi-conductors (the Japanese are the world's leading suppliers) whilst 
nothing would prevent the Soviets or the Chinese from receiving Japanese 
supplies~ 
5. The RAFTERY opinion (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy 
'The inadequacy of COCOM 
Without wishing to belittle the role played by COCOM, it must be 
stressed that the committee's work does not fully meet the present 
requirements. In a field as complex and as fluctuating as that of 
new technologies, the adaptation of Lists of products needs to be 
I PE 97.811/fin., p. 4 
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performed with greater speed and flexibility. It is regrettable, for 
example, that it has taken several years for COCOM to sanction the 
export of small personal computers, even though this represents a 
very Limited adjustment. Moreover, a number of countries such as 
Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden and Austria do not belong to 
COCOM and can evade the regulations on transfers of technology. This 
weakens the scope of COCOM's regulations and produces a distortion of 
competition. It would be sensible, therefore, to consider setting up 
a consultative body for the USA and the Community which would include 
representatives from both the governments and industries concerned 
and could Launch a dialogue at strictly commercial Level which would 
be productive for both sides.•1 
6. The BRAUN-MOSER opinion (Committee on Transport) 
This opinion states that: 
'The (COCOM) control mechanism in its present format neither promotes 
trade Liberalization within the GATT nor advances international 
cooperation. Furthermore, the control exercised by the USA on the 
intergovernmental conference of the COCOM mainly restricts the 
exports of the Community to the COMECON countries rather than USA 
exports because American exports to COMECON account for 10% of the 
total imports of COMECON while Community exports account for about 
79% of all trade between the OECD and COMECON in 1982. 1 2 
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS WITH REGARD TO 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE LIGHT OF THE APPLICATION OF COCOM 
1. Preliminary remark 
Just as the Pegard affair is only one example, so COCOM is only one aspect 
of East-West relations. It should also be noted that in international 
terms it is difficult to separate trade policy Clow Policy) from general 
policy (High Policy), and it is a vain hope to want to make a clear 
distinction between civil and military technologies. 
Ultimately, we arrive back at the familiar dispute between those who 
believe that trade relations promote peace and are the best way for the 
West's democratic values to triumph Ca theory argued by Samuel PISAR in 
particular and recently reiterated by Mr David ROCKEFELLER, President of 
the Trilateral, in the Figaro magazine of 2 November 1985 when he said 
that ' ••• I hope that business and human rights will be separated'), and 
those who fear that the USSR maintains and consolidates its political 
system through the free world's technologies and aid. 
The operation of COCOM is a technical aspect of East-West relations and 
any evaluation of this body is conditioned by the evaluator's views on the 
fundamental issues of international politics. 
I PE 94.246/fin., p. 6 
2 PE 98.215/fin., p. 5 
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The problems which COCOM seems to be experiencing at the moment are only a 
reflection of the fact that the United States and the Community hold 
somewhat different views on international affairs and of problems 
connected with the strategic defence of Europe, particularly the United 
States' Strategic Defense Initiative. 
This is noted by Mr DANKERT in his opinion: 
'Political differences of opinion with the US on the significance of 
trade to East-West relations would appear unbridgeable. The US, in 
its role as a superpower, will always view the USSR in terms of 
military capabilities to a greater extent than Western Europe.' 
(Dankert opinion, PE 97.811/fin. of 31 October 1985, p. 4). 
2. The future of East-West trade 
Some observers believe that East-West relations will slide into a real 
decline for economic and political reasons rooted in both East and West. 
In the East, the Soviet Leaders are apparently aiming at 
self-sufficiency. Speeches and articles underscore the importance of 
socialist economic cooperation and the difficulties encountered by its 
USSR through the acquisition of Western technology. 
In addition, the Soviets seem to be increasingly aware of their dependence 
and their vulnerability as their system of production deteriorates. ~ 
number of Communist Leaders are contemplating recentralizing their economy 
while there are mounting fears in the West about the Eastern bloc's 
solvency. 
3. American trade policy 
Trade relations between the EEC and the USA give rise to certain general 
problems and joint solutions are currently being sought. 
US trade policy towards Eastern Europe is rather different from the EEC's 
policy. In general the Americans control their strategic exports far more 
strictly than the Europeans do. However, there have been certain 
contradictions in American trade policy, for example when the US abandoned 
its wheat embargo and yet called on its allies to tighten their trade 
controls in relations with the Soviets. It should also be borne in mind 
that the United States and the European countries accuse each other of 
protectionism and the danger in this area is a real one. A natural 
consequence of this is that the Europeans sometimes fear that certain 
A~erican actions are designed to protect purely national interests. At 
all events, Western policies may run the risk of increasing costs and a 
relative Loss of markets. 
It must be stressed that no government of a Community Member State has 
ever called for the abolition of COCOM or wanted to withdraw and the 
recent accession of Spain would indicate a desire to continue with this 
type of control while making improvements. 
The position seems to be the same as the Line taken by Mr MITTERRAND as 
early as 1981 in Ottawa when he stated that he was in favour of 
revitalizing COCOM's activities1. 
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4. A common strategy to control exports of strategic products 
First of all the Community Member States must decide what exports of 
strategic products are to be allowed and, on the basis of this decision in 
principle, clarify their position on COCOM. 
It is undoubtedly difficult to control the spread of new technology 
effectively. 
Undoubtedly there are indirect ways of transferring technology to the 
East, especially through countries which are not members of NATO or 
COCOM. In addition, industrial espionage has to be taken into account, 
although this requires considerable amounts of time and finance which make 
it extremely expensive. Added to this, finally, is the new role that 
China could play through the increasing Liberalization of American exports 
to that country. 
It must also be stressed that in issuing export Licences, the trade 
departments sometimes interfere for reasons which are in no way connected 
with defence problems. 
Above all there must be an improvement in cohesion between the 12 
countries in the Community. This was also the wish of the then European 
Commissioner for Industry, Mr DAVIGNON, when he proposed on 17 October 
1984 that a thorough examination be made of the problem of high technology 
transfer with a view to producing a common position between the then 10 
members of the Community which would enable them to improve talks with the 
USA. In addition, the problem then arises of drawing up European Lists 
for the export of strategic products and knowing whether it would be 
useful to have military personnel participate more directly as experts in 
the process of issuing Licences. 
Such a process would, however, also necessitate the Community Member 
States improving the dissemination of information to each other and 
harmonizing their technologies. In general, the problem is the overall 
European response to the modern technological challenge2. But this is 
part of the whole range of European problems because there can be no 
technological Europe without a Large market with no borders based on the 
harmonization of standards, opening of public markets, common legislation 
on industrial property, European quality standards and intra-Community 
competition, monetary and financial cooperation and even a common foreign 
policy. 
Part of this is the response to the problem of European strategic defence 
and the Community's position on strategic defence initiatives by the USSR 
and the USA. 
Finally, there is the possibility of considering a Legal instrument which 
is more rigid than COCOM is its present form. For example, an 
international treaty with strict rules to govern operation, with a clear 
definition of the obligations and rights of all parties and adequate 
publicizing of the related legal provisions. 
lvAKEMPCHOUK - 'Transfers of sensitive technolo ies between East and West' 
Studia diplomatica vol. XXXVII, 1984, No. 
2 See report by Mr PONIATOWSKI (Doc. A 2-109/85) 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 2-466/84) 
tabled by Mrs LIZIN 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Proceudre 
on the Pegard company and exports to COMECON 
The_Euroeean_Parliament, 
ANNEX 
A. aware of the difficulties encountered by the Pegard company ;n Andenne 
which was refused a licence to export a boring and mill;ng machine to the 
USSR, even though it was recognized that the machine was of no strategic 
importance, 
B. aware that this company is once again running a r;sk in requestir,~ a 
licence for another non-strategic export, 
C. believing that it is not in the general interest of European trade and 
industry for the broad interpretation accepted by Belgium with regard to the 
boring and milling machine contract to be applied in future, 
1. Calls on Belgium to grant the Pegard company an export licence in respect 
of the new contract for Bfrs 916 million. 
2. Calls on the Commission and the Council to reaffirm Europe's commercial. 
independence and to confirm that measures are being taken to obtain information 
on American exports to the USSR. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 2-721/84) 
tabled by Mr LINKOHR 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the restrictions imposed by the USA on the international transfer of 
technology and the damaging effects on industrial development in the European 
Community 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas since the end of the 1970s the USA has stepped up its controls 
on the transfer of technology, even to the countries of the European 
Community, by such means as secrecy regulations, export restrictions 
and clauses in public sector contracts, 
B. having regard to the findings of an unpublished study on the restrictions 
imposed on the international transfer of technology by the USA (carried 
out on behalf of the Federal German Ministry for Research and Technology), 
c. concerned at the growing nationalism surrounding technology, whereby the 
USA hopes to achieve economic and technical supremacy, 
D. whereas US export control laws are much more extensive than the equival~nt 
laws in other countries, and also cover re-exports, 
E. fearing that, in the absence of a concerted approach, the European 
Community's technical dependence will lead to ever greater political 
dependence and make it vulnerable to blackmail, 
F. whereas US secrecy regulations seriously impede the exchange of scientific 
data and research results, 
1. Calls on the Council and Commission to bring all their influence to bear 
on the USA to secure the lifting of restrictions on the transfer of 
technology between the USA and the European Community; 
2. Calls on the Commission to have proposals for countermeasures at the ready 
in the event of the restrictions being maintained; 
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3. Reaffirms its view that the level of advanced technology in Europe should 
be improved by greater cooperation within the framework of the Community 
research and industrial policy, particularly in the fields of data proces-
sing, automation, biotechnology, aeronautics and aerospace, new materials 
and telecommunications; 
4. Calls on the Commission to draw up a report on the current state of 
technology transfer between Western countries; 
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the 
Commission. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Political Affairs Committee 
Draftsman: Mr P. DANKERT 
By Letter of 31 January 1985, the Political Affairs Committee requested 
authorization to deliver an opinion on the political aspects of the transfer 
of technology. 
By Letter of 11 February 1985, the committee was authorized to deliver an 
opinion on this subject. 
At its meeting of 22 March 1985, the Political Affairs Committee appointed 
Mr DANKERT draftsman of the opinion. 
It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 31 October 1985 and 
unanimously adopted the conclusions contained therein 
The following took part in the vote: Mr HANSCH, first vice-chairman and acting 
chairman; Mr DENIAU, third vice-chairman; Mr DANKERT, draftsman; Mr BALFE 
(deputizing for Mr LOMAS), Mr CHRISTIANSEN (deputizing for Mr WALTER), 
Mr FITZGERALD (deputizing for Mrs ANGLADE), Mr FLANAGAN, Mr B. FRIEDRICH, 
Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr NEWENS, Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for 
Lord DOURO), Mr PELIKAN (deputizing for Mr AMADEI), Mr PENDERS, 
Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mr POETTERING, Mr SABY (deputizing for Mrs CHARZAT), Mr SEGRE, 
Mr TZOUNIS (deputizing for Mr ANTONIOZZI) and Sir Peter VANNECK. 
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The arms race between East and West is also a contest in advanced technology. 
Easy access by one side to the other's technological innovations is the 
cheaper option; but it also brings about an intensification of the arms race. 
There are therefore good reasons for restricting the transfer of militarily 
sensitive technology to the USSR and its allies. The United States and its 
NATO allies, together with Japan, regulate this via agreements within the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). A COCOM List 
of 'strategic goods' is drawn up at fairly regular intervals; only under very 
restrictive conditions may such goods be exported to Communist countries. 
The negotiations on the basis of which the COCOM list is drawn up are 
increasingly Laborious: not only does the US Department of Defense exert 
considerable pressure with a view to adopting a very restrictive policy - the 
Pentagon still takes the view that the COCOM List should be subject to 
continuous review in the Light of recommendations from a new committee of 
military advisers - but the increasing difficulties also result from the fact 
that, in a number of areas of tecnnoLo~,, ~,~il developments are more advanced 
than military developments and that, consequently, COCOM restrictions inhibit 
normal trade. Such curbs even extend to COCOM's member states: the COCOM List 
is incorporated into national Legislation, as a result of which export 
Licences are required for transactions both within the COCOM area and with 
Communist-bloc countries. US Legislation - the Export Administration Act and 
the extraterritorial nature thereof - further complicates the issue. 
Consequently, COCOM-related issues are increasingly a source of friction in 
the far from untroubled trading relations between Japan, the US and the 
European Community. In view of the major significance of US defence contracts 
for technological innovation, the expanding role of the Department of Defense 
in the export of US technology, outside the COCOM forum, is a further 
disruptive factor. The Pentagon employs not only the COCOM List but also its 
own, confidential List: it approaches the government departments responsible 
for issuing export Licences and often succeeds in making US policy more 
restrictive than is called for under COCOM agreements. 
In recent years, the political problems arising from regulating the export of 
strategic goods primarily related to the East-West dimension. The gas 
pipeline affair of a few years ago is the best example of this type of problem. 
Although doubts may be entertained that European opposition to the ban imposed 
by President Reagan on US undertakings from supplying parts for the so-called 
Siberian gas pipeline, from either the US or US subsidiaries in Europe, was 
motivated by political rather than economic considerations, the ban itself was 
a major political event in US relations with Europe, as too was the decision 
by European enterprises to supply such goods in spite of this ban. 
For at Least two reasons, the confrontation between the US and Europe over the 
Siberian gas pipeline is still significant today: 
1. The conflict demonstrated that there could be serious differences of 
opinion between the US and Europe on major aspects of policy on East-West 
relations. 
2. It also indicated that excessive technological dependence forces Western 
Europe into political subservience too. That this could be avoided in 
connection with the gas pipeline affair was due not only to European 
opposition but also to the fact that some US undertakings experienced 
difficulties after breaking the contract in question. It was even more 
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significant that the US President simultaneously allowed a major delivery 
of cereals to the USSR to proceed, as a result of which the general 
impression was that double standards were being applied to this particular 
issue. 
The new Export Administration Act incorporates safeguards against interference 
with existing contracts. Nevertheless, because of the extraterritorial nature 
of this Legislation, there are insufficient safeguards against the rise of new 
conflicts. This in itself is a major incentive for initiatives geared towards 
strengthening Europe's technological base (Esprit, Eureka, etc.). 
Political differences of opinion with the US on the significance of trade to 
East-West relations would appear unbridgeable. The US, in its role as a 
superpower, will always view the USSR in terms of military capabilities to a 
greater extent than Western Europe. The issue of the division of Germany and 
Western Europe's preference for d~tente - the Latter is related to a certain 
extent to the former - combine to ensure that the European Community, as a 
trading power, will continue to favour the strengthening of commercial 
relations with Eastern Europe. Trade in high-technology products offers the 
best opportunity of expanding the current fairly narrow basis of relations. 
A separate problem with regard to the COCOM List of strategic goods is the 
inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the group of Communist 
countries to which the list applies. There is both strategic and commercial 
justification for a more flexible policy vis-a-vis the People's Republic. 
It has already been noted that COCOM restrictions are of significance not only 
to trade with Communist countries but also to commercial dealings among the 
member states of COCOM itself. The incorporation of COCOM agreements into 
national legislation is detrimental to the European market in particular: an 
export Licence is required in order to trade, within Western Europe, in goods 
that are subject to COCOM conditions. 
Should such goods contain components in respect of which an export Licence 
issued by a third country is required, transactions may be seriously delayed. 
In particular, there are often problems in connection with Licences to be 
issued by the United States for exports from Italy to the Netherlands, for 
example. In the case of products or components manufactured outside the 
United States but subject to the extraterritorial provisions of the Export 
Administration Act, there are additional complications: western European 
governments do not recognize the extraterritoriality of this Act and, because 
of this refusal, they are unable to assist undertakings in obtaining a 
re-export licence from the US. 
In practice, therefore, the COCOM list gives rise to major difficulties for 
Community Member States in their trading relations with each other. 
Obviously, at a time when it is wrestling with major trading problems caused 
by the high dollar exchange rate, the US will be readily suspected of using 
procedural difficulties as a pretext for promoting domestic trade (see NRC 
Handelsblad of 4 July 1985). The role of the COCOM agreements in this has 
helped to create a climate of mutual mistrust within the Atlantic Alliance. 
Specific measures to improve the situation will not be easy to devise. The 
best solution would be for the COCOM countries to conclude an agreement 
whereby the goods Listed by them may circulate freely within the COCOM area. 
COCOM is not the only source of political problems in the field of technology 
transfer: reference has already been made to the United States' own, more 
far-reaching policy. As a result of the increasing importance of defence 
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contracts to the economy - currently, in particular, SDI-related contracts -
there is a risk that the role of the Department of Defense in US policy-making 
on exports will be consolidated. In view of Japan's development in 
particular, it is far from fanciful to suggest that the already marked 
tendency in the US to prevent Japanese access to new technology will be 
heightened by the Pentagon. It is inevitable that such a move will affect 
Europe too. 
Trade conflicts with the US have hitherto been viewed primarily as conflicts 
about steel- and agriculture-related problems. Nevertheless, and in view of 
the serious Japanese threat to what remains of the US electronics industry, 
the present conflict will probably spread quickly: advance warning has already 
been given by the problems within COCOM and by the issue of the 
extraterritorial nature of US Legislation. 
Commercial and foreign policies are inextricably Linked. The worsening trade 
problems affecting relations between the US and Europe, the US and Japan and, 
of course, Japan and Western Europe cannot remain immune to political 
consequences. 
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DRAFT OPINION 
(Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
Draftsman: Mr RAFTERY 
On 21 November 1984 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy appointed Mr RAFTERY draftsman. 
At its meeting of 22 April 1985 the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy considered the draft report and adopted its 
conclusions unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote 
SEAL (Chairman), BEAZLEY (Vice-Chairman), RAFTERY (Draftsman), BESSE, 
BEUMER, CAROSSINO (replacing Bonaccini), CASSIDY, FRIEDRICH, GAUTIER, 
Mrs GREDAL, van HEMELDONCK, Mr HERMAN, KILBY (replacing de FERRANTI), 
OPPENHEIM, PATTERSON, Ms QUIN, ROGALLA 
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1. American restrictions on transfers of technology 
After a period of relative Liberalism, in Line with its so-called policy 
of detente, the United States has gradually stepped up its controls on the 
transfer of technology. The strengthening of these controls reached a 
critical point on 18 June 1982 when the United States President decided to 
extend the ban it had imposed on American companies concerning exports to the 
Soviet Union of materials intended for use in the construction of the Siberian 
gas pipeline, to foreign subsidiaries of American companies and to 
undertakings holding American licences. This attempt to impose American Law 
extraterritorially and retroactively,on the European governments concerned 
produced a very perceptible hardening of attitudes in trade relations between 
the EEC and the United States. 
The common position taken by the Member States of the Community, the 
reactions of certain American industrial circles affected by the ban and the 
growing scepticism as to the real effects of these economic sanctions led the 
American Administration to suspend these measures in November 1982 (Non-paper 
arrangement). However, the trade dispute between the EEC and the USA in this 
field was certainly not resolved by the November 1982 arrangement. 
For example, the agreement reached by COCOM(1) on 13 July 1983 following 
long negotiations on the third list of products with dual civil and 
military use is far from being wholly satisfactory, even though the export of 
small personal computers is now accepted. 
Furthermore, the 1979 Export Administration Act has now been revised. The 
text adopted by Congress provides for the maintenance of strict controls on 
exports. Under the new Legislation, foreign companies which ignore the 
American ban on the export of goods considered to be of strategic importance 
will be prohibited access to American markets. Similarly, the US Trade 
Department reserves the right to refuse export authorizations to US 
companies until such time as their overseas subsidiaries give a contractual 
commitment to comply with American trade regulations. The Legislation adopted 
by the USA does not bode well, therefore, for a liberalization of policy on 
transfer of technology. 
(1) COCOM (Consultative Group Cooperation Committee), a coordinating committee 
for the multilateral control of exports, is comprised of Japan and the 
member countries of NATO, with the exception of Iceland and Spain 
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2. The harmful economic effects on the Community of US restrictions 
on the international transfer of technology 
The position of the Community as regar~trade with the COMECON countries 
is very different from that of the United States in terms of both type and 
quantity. In 1980, for ~xample only 9% of American exports were to COMECON 
countries and only 3% of American imports came from these countries. In 
contrast, Western Europe accounted for 80% of all trade between the OECD and 
COMECON in 1980. In addition, it should be noted in particular that, whereas 
the USA exports mainly agricultural products to the Soviet Union, 
Community exports are principally of manufa::turedgoods. 
This produces a technological interdependence (spare parts; future 
deliveries .•• ) and implies, a sertain degree of mutual trust. 
In other words, the US restrictions on the transfer of technology have a 
much greater effect in the Commu·nity, than they have in the US. 
Moreover, the ban on exports of material intended for the Siberian gas 
pipeline clearly showed the effects of such restrictions on the European 
economy. Thousands of jobs were at risk during this embargo and the 
governments concerned responded, some by using their right of requisition in 
respect of the companies concerned, others by turning to the courtsC1). 
Recently, the Pegard company, which manufactures machine tools in Belgium, 
was refused a licence to export a boring and milling machine to the Soviet 
Union, even though it was recognized that the machine was of no strategic 
importance. Had it not been for the intervention of the Belgian Government, 
the survival of the company would have been seriously threatened(2). In 
addition to their effects on economic activity, the US restrictions also pose 
a serious threat to the unity of the European market. 
(1) In the Sensor versus CEP case, the Hague District Court ruled clearly 
against the extraterritorial application of the US embargo decision. Its 
ruling therefore compelled the Dutch company, a subsidiary of an American 
company, to honour its contract with the CEP, the destination of which was 
the Soviet Union. (The Hague District Court. Compagnie europeenne des 
petroles - Sensor Nederland. 17 September 1982. International Legal 
materials. July 1982, Vol. XXI) 
(2) Motion for a resolution Doc. 2-466/84 
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Nevertheless, the areas of dispute are not just the harmful effects of 
these restrictions. In fact, numerous subsidiaries of American companies are 
justifiably worried by the severe penalties Laid down in the Export 
Administration Act and are refraining from infringing the export restrictions 
Laid down by the US Administration. As a result, the Community economy, 
has suffered an undeniable Loss of activity. It would therefore be useful for 
the Commission, as far as is possible, to compile a revvew of the harmful effects 
caused by American restrictions on the transfer of technology. 
The Community cannot accept a US trade policy, prompted by 
specific political ends and in some respects contrary to international 
Law, especially regarding its extraterritorial and retroactive application, 
if that policy is damaging the future of the European economy. This is 
all the more true when the unity of its market and its independence in the 
field of trade and energy are threatened. Moreover, it is increasingly 
apparent that, under the cover of secrecy and in the guise of foreign 
policy, the USA is seeking to protect its dominant position vis-a-vis 
the Community in advanced technological sectors. For example, in the field 
of products with dual civil and military use, it is difficult to know whether 
the controls on exports are intended to widen the technological gap with the 
COMECPN countries or with the USA's Western trading parterns. 
3. The position of the Community 
It is clear that, faced with a crisis situation, the Member States of the 
Community will have to take the necessary retaliatory measures in the form of 
requiiition orders or compensation within the framework of GATT. The European 
Parliament can only recommend that the Commission show greater firmness in 
these cases. Nevertheless, it is clearly not in the interests of either side 
of the Atlantic to embark on a trade war which, · certainly for its part, 
the Cpmmunity does not want. 
There appear to be two courses of action open to the Community in this area. On t 
one hand, measures should be taken to recreate the right cor.id:i.tions .. for fair trading 
practices, notably by improving existing instruments, and on the other, to 
stren9then the Community's own technological cooperation • 
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Ca) The inadequacy of COCOM 
Without wishing to belittle the role played by COCOM, it must be stressed 
that the committee's work does not fully meet present requirements. In a 
field as complex and as fluctuating as that of new technologies, the 
adaptation of Lists of products needs to be performed with greater speed and 
flexibility. It is regrettable, for example, that it has taken several years 
for COCOM to sanction the export of small personal computers, even though this 
represents a very limited adjustment. Moreover, a number of countries such as 
Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden and Austria do not belong to COCOM and 
can evade the regulations on transfers of technology. This weakens the scope 
of COCOM's regulations and produces a distortion of competition: It would be 
sensible, therefore, to consider setting up a consultative body for the USA 
and the Community which would include representatives from both the 
governments and industries concerned and could Launch a dialogue at strictly 
commercial Level which would be productive for both sides. 
(b) The work of international bodies 
The slow progress of the work undertaken by the United Nations Conference 
on an International Code for the Transfer of Technology, which is next due to 
meet during the first half of 1985, is . to be regretted. The European 
Parliament can only recommend that the Commission participate as actively as 
possible in the development of this work, which concerns transfers of 
technology between both East and West and North and South. 
As far as the activities of the European Parliament are concerned, the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy can only 
stress the vital role played by the US Congress and European Parliament 
Delegations and call for the continuation and strengthening of this dialogue. 
Cc) The activities of transnational undertakings 
The restrictions imposed by the USA on transfers of technology assume a 
particular significance in the light of the vast network of transnational 
undertakings, of which the great majority are American. This raises the 
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problem of controlling the activities of these undertakings, the effects of 
their dependence on US legislation and the improper contractual clauses which 
they accept and with which they comply 
(d) Strengthening technological cooperation in the Community 
E~suring the independence of the Community's trade policy in the face of a 
dominant partner will not be easy, particularly as the Community has not yet 
regained an adequate level of ,competitiveness. The 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy can only 
stress the need to step up investment in research and development and increase 
Community funding in this sector and to strengthen cooperation between the 
Member States, particularly on projects like the ESPRIT programme. 
In conclusion, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy : 
1. Condemns the unacceptable restrictions on the transfer of technology 
to the EEC and on the export of certain high technology products 
made in the Community and considers that these restrictions, which 
in the way they operate are often contrary to international trade 
laws and inappropriate to their military and political objectives, 
constituting too often an abuse of America's dominant position in 
the technological field and, amongstother things, reflect a disturbing 
increase in US protectionism; 
2. Draws attention to the potential conflict between the application of 
the US legislation, which can effect the transfer of technology 
between European Country Members States, and the provisions of the 
EEC Treaty in the fields of the internal market and competition 
policy. 
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3. Stresses the serious effects of these commercial practices on the economic 
development of the Community, particularly on employment, and on the 
Community's independence in the field of trade and energy; calls 
therefore on the Commission and Council to respond vigorously to these 
practices using all the means at their disposal and asks the Commission 
to report on actions taken since the beginning of the year; 
4. Calls on the Commission and Council, in order to avoid crisis situations 
of this kind in trade relations between the USA and the Community the 
two Largest trading blocs in the world, to seek continually to 
persuade the US Administration to establish a permanent dialogue with 
the Community which would promote a better understanding of the problems 
and their implications and ensure that trade regulations and undertakings 
are respected; 
5. Is of the opinion, in spite of recent positive steps (liberalisation 
of controls on personal computers, and the acceptance of the principle 
that revision of the List of equipment under control should keep pace 
with the advances in technology), that the functioning of COCOM is 
not really satisfactory; 
Notices that the decisions of this body, which are often restricting 
the normal dissemination of technology and exchange of scientific 
knowledge, invariably reflect the preoccupations of US foreign policy 
which are clearly dominant within COCOM; 
Notices that the putting into practice of COCOM decisions is not always 
carried out uniformly thus putting certain Community countries at a 
disadvantage. 
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6. Proposes to this end that, in view of the inadequacies of the Cooperation 
Committee for the multilateral control of exports (COCOM), a bipartite 
USA/EEC committee be set up, composed of representatives of the 
governments and industries t~ examine systematically the 
complex questions related to transfers of technology so as to prevent any 
restrictions which are not based on undisputed motives of security in 
East-West relations; 
7. Calls also for the work undertaken by the UN Conference on an 
International Code for the Transfer of Technology to be pursued and for 
the Commission to play an active role in it; 
8. Stresses that, generally speaking, the difficulties in trade relations 
between the USA and the Community stem Largely from the serious Lack of 
cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic on economic and monetary 
matters, and is relying on the European Parliament and US Congress 
Delegations to continue to emphasize the need for the closer economic and 
monetary cooperation between the USA and the Community which is vital for 
the international economic order; 
9. Calls finally on the Community to step up its cooperation in the field of 
research and innovation so as to reduce the technological gap and secure 
its commercial independence; to this end, calls for an increase in 
Community funding for research and commercialisati:oh 6f researct, findings, 
and awaits new proposals from the commission in this field. 
- 31 - PE 92.716/fin. 
OPINION 
(Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Transport 
Draftsman: Mrs BRAUN-MOSER 
On 25 April 1985, the Committee on Transport appointed Mrs BRAUN-MOSER 
draftsman of the opinion. 
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 18-19 
.June 1985 and 30 October 1985. It adopted the draft opinion at its cast 
meeting unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr ANASTASSOPOULOS, chairman; 
Mr KLINKENBORG, vice-chairman; Mrs BRAUN-MOSER, draftsman; Mr CORNELISSEN 
(deputising for Mr STARITA), Mr CAROSSINO, Mr EBEL, Mr REMACLE, Mr VAN DER WAAL 
and Mr WIJSENBEEK. 
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(. I NTfWDUC TOR'f 
1. lhe report TOU~SAINT rai5t>s three interreL.1ted but fundamt:ntal issues that 
concerns directly the rom~un~ty: 
a) the role and current practice of the Coordinating Committee (in brief, 
CoCOM) which is res~0~s~bie for the control of exports of strategic 
importance to C~~EC0N countrie~; 
b) the economic siy:,ifitance of !he East-West trade and its impact on the 
transfer of technology; 
c> the relatiors, generat~d by considerations of trade, between the Community 
end the CGMECON countries in the field of transport. 
2. At the he3rt of the ccntro~ersial case surrounding strategic trade there are 
three inst~tutions of different nature and objectives which are bound to work 
togetrer due to events and circumstances; these institutions are: the CoCOM, 
the COMECON and the Community. A brief comment on the first two would help 
understbnd the importance and comole~ity ot the transport relations between 
the Ten, and froM J~nuary 1st, 1?86 the Twelver and the COMECON countries. 
3. The Courcil for Mut~a, Econ~~it Assistan:e (abbreviated as COMECON) was 
j . 19'9 f .. · . f • S · · U · 1> creat2, 1n January .... a te>r an ,1,t1at,ve o tr1e ov,et n,on. 
COi~f=C1)i·,'s °k1J'1der-:r.u,,t:r·•s ... ·ere: Soviet :.Jnion, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Rumaria ~ith the objective to form a broad economic 
r~-operation. East Germ3~y end Ai~ania became full members soon after the 
formation of the CJMECON coun~il, although the latter has taken no part in 
:JMEC0N work since 1961. J~gcsla11ia tin 1964), Mongolia (in 1962), Cuba 
(in 197~> and Vie:nam Cin 1978) ~~ve Maintain~d differing degrees of involve-
ment it) council participation or standing commissions. COMECON's economic 
signiiicance is correctly stated in th~ Economist's Survey: ''Yet COMECON mat-
t~r-s: it unites - and ;;ometimes divides the west's principal economic and 
militar) rivals; its members term a tenth of the world's population, and 
certainly µroducP mor,;, than a tenth of t:11:" t~orld's income" (1), p.3). 
A careful an"3Lysis ,"!f the trade sotistics ;-cveals that commercial links ot 
the OECD countries wit~ thE COMECON have grown significantly. It is estim~ted 
thdt in 1984 the So,ri ~·t Union exr:ior·ted to the OErn nearly $ 24 bn worth o'f 
r.,,Jr.r:s while it imporr,:r; m',lrt \' !t:?? br> worth of OECD exports; the othr.r i;il( 
lc1~,v·rr, Europec.1n cow1t1·1f:'_: lr-zjd,~.l Les!:. with OECD but stHI. enough to account 
for :;1r, :,n worth ot UH:-ir e:;µor1:!: ,,hite impo,·tiri:! fn:,ri, CECO some $12 bn 
worth ot goods. 
ll This panyraph heavily ,·el;pc; on H,e E(:0;·101~::;t's s,;,·vt:y •J'i 'J.nside COMECON', 
Apr-ii. 20, 1985 
- 33 - PE 92.716/fin. 
5. The Consultative Group Cooperations Committee (CoCOM, in short) was formed in 
June 1950 after an initiative of the USA in order to coordinate the exports 
2) 
1;1 strategic importance of its 15 country members. The role, objectives and 
functioning of the CoCOM are fully described in the TOUSSAINT report. Briefly, 
the CoCOM acts as an export control mechanism; it has no formal treaty and is 
subject to the voluntary cooperation of its members. A list of embargoed export 
items of strategic importance has been maintained which today accounts for 
about 150 manufactured goods. A notable example of this control mechanism has 
been the dicision of the Reagan administration in June 1982 to ban exports to 
the Soviet Union of materials intended for the construction of the Siberian 
gas pipeline. Exceptions to the embargoed list require a unanimous vote of 
the ·15. 
6. Critics of the CoCOM, like the two m6tions for a resolution (Doc. 2-721/84 
and Doc. 2-466/84) upon which the TOUSSAINT report is based, believe that 
suet, a control mechanism in its present format neither promotes trade Libera-
lisation within the GATT nor advances international co-operation. Furthermore 
the control exercised by the USA on the intergovernmental conference of the 
CoCOM ~,&inly ~estricts the exports of the Community to the COMECON countries 
rather than USA ~xports because American exports to COMECON account for 10 per 
cent of the total imports of COMECON while Community exports account for about 
79 per cent of all trade between OECD and COMECON in 1982. 
7. Such criticism partly touches the issues at stake. From a pure Community point 
of view, restrictions of high-technology capital goods raise two interrelated 
~ssues: 
a) the role of hi-technology in economic development, 
b) the transport policy towards COMECON countries. 
We consider briefly the above interrelated issues in the following chapters. 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EAST-WEST TRADE 
8. There are three forms of transfer of technology or dissemination of technoto-
9ical information: 
i) direct investment, 
ii) licensing of k:lm1-how, 
iii) export of capital goods embodying high-technology 
2) CoCOM's 15 members are the member countries of NATO with the exception of 
Iceland but inclusion of Japan 
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extent in i). The Soviet hluC ~eecis the transfer of embodied technology beca~se 
the so-called 'techn0Logic.1l gili,.'' is ,r:de and because it has a comparati·,10. 
disadvantage in marketing ano innovatio~s - which is due to institutional 
t'CH1str.1ints .- whilf' it h;i~ .-1 ,·,,,n,,,1,·:,t i1c' ,1d1.111t.,.ir '" 1<t,•d111·i11\l m;:illl1f.~, !111 r,i 
,;oods. This is why we exµ ... , ',t•nce the East-West trc1de to tlourish not onl.y in 
'high' technology goods but also in ·~tandarised' technology already ava,~ab.( 
;ind wide-soread. 
9. In othPr words the high technology trade determined essentially by innovati0ns 
.:.inr: emb0Ji1.~j in n"".,. product\ ..ihe:i sol6 1:0 the countries of the Eastern bloc, 
its producers, having the comparative advantage in production, would quickly 
imitat~ the innovators and ~ence produce 'investment goods' without reco1irse 
Lo R Jn~ D i~ tne first place, leadi~g to technical progress. On the ether 
hand buying standarised technology embodied in exportables but unavailable in 
the Soviet bloc it ~0uld allc~ to !dopt, 91ven again a comparative advantage 
in production, a ne•..J process of p•·orJuction leading to a reduction of resources 
used or alternatively to gr~~ter outout with the same resources and the;~fnre 
contributing to technical ?rc~ress. 
10. On the other hand, the ow~ers of s~r~rior technology, ie the West, enjoy a 
tempar~ry mcnopoly position in ~orld market so long the difference betwee,1 
.-1,r i'"-'f'I of tpchnol,,qic,d :,;c:hie·.i~ments io:: mair1tained. sur.h a mo11opoly 
positio,, would give t1..JO ad,1antagt':'s to 1:he West; first it would earn a monopol:t 
rent and a~so assume a strategic superiority, if such technological knowledge 
i~ embodied i~ its product~; sec0nd, a technology leader could reinvest its 
monopo 1 y rent leadi~g to ~urt~er· innovations and further advantages by expending 
reso11~ces on Rand Din order tJ consolidate and extend its advantage ~n other 
f ir?Ld:; .3S W11ll. 
il. On both accounts, the Community s~ems t0 be a Loser; the Community is ~o: a 
techro'ogv le&der and henc~ i,s ~onopoly rent is not very significa~t. E~pirical 
r~sea:cn into tne trade flows ~upports t~i~ argument since the greatest share 
0+ tech~otogy-based products imoorted oy COMfCON is found to embody 'standa~ised' 
te~~~ology which ac~ounts tor about 80 per cent of the total. 
:1. :,;,,,·1.:-.- 111 c:r,·,. t!H• q1J.:,1't it:'l'::,;1· :·e::,r,ction~ se~ t,y CoCOM or. high-t~t:hn•>L•J£)' 
an:..i 10r :-e,,3ons o·f hatd r.;r:(',v::; to,- the Sc.viet bloc, the imports o+ 
21.ectr,:,nics etc) for .;h·:ch the ·=0mrnun 1t/ has a comporative adv.;ntage, are 
iin·it·~d; ,inl:, ~m~ of the tctet a1;c,;·.)r.t;; for s,i. .. h ris:i··technology goods. 
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III. TRADE FLOWS AND COMMUNITY TRANSPORT POLICY 
1'>. The pattern of trade Largely determ·ines the means of transport upon which trade 
,...ol icies are formed and are conc;uct(•d. furthermore the pattern of trade would 
determine - in conjuction with the size of the market and the division of 
labour - the specialisation of one mode of transport in a specific sector. Hence 
the three determinants of an optimum transport policy vis-a-vis two trading 
parties are: 
a) the pattern of trade, 
b) the size of the market, 
c) the technology used in the field of transport 
14. with a given pattern of trade between the Community and the COMECON as described 
in the previous section and determined by considerations other than transport 
and given the fact that there is a 'technological gap' of equal size and appli-
cable in the field of transport, the only determinant that is left unknown is 
the size of the market. One of the more important questions related to the size 
of the market is the institutional structure or, to put it differently, the 
market practices that prevail. Trading in high-technology or standarised products 
with the COMECON, therefore, begs the question of fair or unfair practices or 
adherence to the principles of the market. The shares of the participating 
enterprises cannot be determined unless one examines the prevailing market 
practices cf COMECON and Community transport undertakings. 
15 ·rh C . T h d L d 3> h f . . f . , e omm,ttee on ransport as repeate y stresse t e un a,r practices o 
COMECON transport undertakings derived mainly from the 'hidden subsidies' affo~Je~ 
uy the state which Lead to ;:ihone}' lower costs affecting adversely fair competition, 
the market principles and the principle of reciprocity. Hence at taxpayer's 
expense, the state-owned transport enterprises undercut fares, penetrate the 
markets of the West and the Third World expanding in this way COMECONS's external 
economic power. 
16. Assume that the Community follows suit and subsidises its transporters so as 
to bring its rates to the Level charged by COMECON, would Community undertakings 
be able to compete in Eastern markets? The answer is that they would be equ~lly 
competitive but they would obtain no freight and this because the allocation o~ 
freight and charters is in the hands of the centrally-planned state bodies that • 
control also the transport sector. Hence embarking on a subsidy race with the 
con::co~~ countries wo•.,ld be set f- r:;efoat ing. 
3) See the JUNG report~~ 'the EEC's relations with t·1~ CO~ECON countries in the 
tield of maritime shippin~· (Doc.51/79) O.J. No C 140 of 5.6.79 and the HOFFMANN 
report on 'relations bet-.,een the EEC and the COMECON countries in-t"he field of 
.·a:-.spcrt po~·icy' (Doc.1-·283/82) O.J. ,,o C 233 of 13.9.82 
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17. Excluding any organiz«tion of ~cirr.11,,,riit: .. trade and ,ts transport sector·on the 
same state-monopoly lines, tr.e Community, in its adherence to the principles 
of the Rome Treaty, offers equal rights regarding the access to its cargoes 
and freedom of establishment to COMECON subsidiaries and acquisitions in its 
territory. It has resulted in excessive penetration of Community markets by 
exploiting the advantages of a free market. 
18. F1Jrthermore the 'transit rule' as practiced today is unfair to Community's 
interests because it allows COMECON's transport enterprises to take part in 
third countries' traffic without legal restrictions whereas COl!fflUtlity transport 
undertakings require bilateral agreements. 
19. Of the six modes of transport: rail, air, road, inland navigation, pipelines 
ond maritime shipping, giver. the various degrees of protection by the Ten, 
maritime shipping seems to be faced with the severest proble•s. Community 
fleets are, with various form~ of restrictions, not allowed to bid for freight 
in COMECON countries. Even in cro~s-trade, the Community fleet cannot compete 
not because it has a comparative disadvantage but because COMECON countries 
set 1.r.ecoronic rates c!er-h,ed frcx.i the st.:r:.e-cCX1trolleci trade and hidden SIJ:Jlid111. 
20. In its documented HENNIG opinion 4> the ESC echoed the same sentiaents and 
urged the Community, in forming an opinion on the appropriate action she should 
follow, to start negotiations with the COMECON based on the 'principle of 
reciprocity'. The Committee on Transport would therefore repeat its request to 
institute a consultative procedure between the COIIIMJnity and the COMECON 
countries. 
lV. CONCLUSIONS 
21. The Committee on Transport asks the Committee on Exttrnal Economic Relations 
to include the following into its motion for a resolution 
i) Notes that in recognising the str3tegic importance that Western expo.rts 
carry, th~ objectives set for the CoCOM to act IS a control mechanism 
are worth noting; 
ii) Stresses, however, that in an increasingly changing world in the technolo-
gical field and flux state of independent supp~iers of ~apital goods expt>rts, 
the efforts made by the CoCOM to regulate certain exports have sometimes 
harmed Community irlt~r·e~ts and have usulttd in ineff-ict~y; 
1d Eco:,o;,lic c:nd Soci.31 C.:ir.1,:11::~P.~ 01 the Et:, '::a 1 s trar,s::,ort proble:.:!: with 
East European Countri~~· arussels, Nov. 1977 
f-,' --
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iii) Urges the Council to mandate the Cofllfllission ot the EC to represent 
the Community to thP. CoCOM and, on behalf of the Ten, present specific 
proposals aiming at reformil"'g the internal functioning of the CoCOM so 
that trade between OECD and COM€CON could be increased w;thout 
iv) Believes that the pattern of trade, to a large extent, determines the 
mode of transport and that the guidelines for the conduct of trade 
(ie not to cause or threaten to cause serious injury> between the 
Community and the COMECON countries should apply to transport policies 
as well; 
v> Adheres to the principle of reciprocity which holds the view that all 
bilateral or multilateral trade arrangements should not be concluded 
without involving a reciprocal a~rangement for transport undertakings; 
reciprocity should be interpreted to mean: 
a) equal rights for Community enterprises with regard to access to 
cargoes and acquisition of holding~ in CONECON countries, 
b) freedom of establishment in COMECON countries under the same legal 
conditions, 
c) abolition of SOMECON tax policies on Community transport enter-
prises, 
d) transparency a~ regards cross-trade and transit transport, 
e) fair shares with regard to ComMun1ty-COM:CON trade. 
vi) Points out that where unfair practices and unfair competition occurs, 
the principles of the market economy cannot be applied and that orderly 
competition with COMECON countries therefore requires a C011munity-
coordinated policy on trade and transport; 
vii) Notes with satisfaction the dec~sior. of the European Council at the 
Milan Summit relating to the exploratory mandate given to the 
Commission but urges the Commission to uphold the principle of 
reciprocity in its negotiations with the COMECON. 
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